afforded more generous preferences to the ]cast developed countries, to dcvcloping nations that undertook certain measurcs to protect the environment and labor rights, and to twelve nations involved in efforts to combat drug trafficking. India originally challenged the cnvironmental, labor and drug-related preferences, but latcr limited its complaint to only the drug preferences. A The purpose of this paper is to review the current state of the law in the WTO system, and to ask whether economic analysis can offer any wisdom about the proper extent of "discrimination" through GSP measures. As shall become clear, the issues arc challenging onus, both from a legal and an economic standpoint. There are good economic reasons to be concerned about discrimination and reciprocity in GSP schemes, and respectable legal arguments that they should he strictly limited. GSP benefits arc "gifts" of a sort, however, and tight limitations on their terms may put an end to them altogether. It is exceedingly difficult to say whether discrimination and reciprocity in GSP schemes make the trading community worse off or better off over the long haul.
WTO panel ruled in
Section 2 provides legal and historical background, including a description of the GSP schemes currently in place in the United States and Europe, and a thorough review of the recent panel and Appellate Body decisions. Section 3 evaluates the Appellate Body decision from a legal perspective and considers its possible implications for aspects of the U.S. and European GSP schemes that were not challenged by India. Section 4 examines trade preferences from an economic perspective, inquiring into the soundness of the GSP concept as a whole and asking European Communities -Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R, December 1, 2003 (hereafter Panel Rep.) .
whether some forms of "discrimination" are somehow better than others.
Legal Background
Resolution 21() at UNCTAD II in 1968 called for the establishment of a "generalized, non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory system of preferences in favour of the developing countries, including special measures in favour of the least advanced among the developing countries." It further stated that such preferences had three objectives: to increase the export earnings of developing countries, to promote their industrialization, and to accelerate their rates of economic growth.
From the outset of serious negotiations within UNCTAD, however, it wa-s clear that the "non-discriminatory system of preferences" envisioned by Resolution 21(ii) would in fact embody considerable elements of "discrimination." Indeed, Resolution 21(u) on its face contemplates discrimination in favor of the least developed countries. Further, the theory behind GSP was that it would reduce the reliance of developing countries on exports of primary products and promote industrialization. Accordingly, it was understood that manufactured goods would be the main beneficiaries of preferences, and that agricultural products would be treated less favorably. . This "discrimination" across sectors inevitably produces a kind of de facto discrimination across beneficiaries -some beneficiaries have far greater capacity to produce the manufactured goods that are designated for preferential treatment than others.
Beyond these features built into the conception of the system. political factors intruded heavily on the willingness of nations to grant prelbrences across the board. Some developing countries were seen as ideologically unacceptable recipients of preferences, many produced manufactured goods in politically sensiti~e import sectors such as textiles and footwear, and the possibility of import surges was a matter of significant concern. Thus, it quickly became clear that if GSP schemes were to be politically viable in the major developed nations, they would have to contain substantial additional limitations as to product coverage and beneficiaries, and he 'See OECD SucrctarN General (1983) .
accompanied by safeguards to address politically unacceptable increases in imports. No mechanism existed for coordinating the evolution of national schemes on such matters, and thus each developed rather differently.
Along the way, some preference-granting countries began to condition GSP benefits on the willingness of beneficiary nations to cooperate on various policy margins, either by rewarding cooperation with greater preferences or punishing its absence by withdrawing them. The conception of GSP as a "non-reciprocal" program thus came under considerable pressure as well.
GSP Scope and Conditionality in the United States and Europe
UNCTAD reports that there are currently 16 national GSP schemes notified to the UNCTAD secretariat --Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria. Canada, the Czech Republic, the European Community, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States. 6 They differ in significant detail, and interested readers may consult the UNCTAD website for the particulars of various systems. Our purpose here is simply to show how the more important schemes are riddled with provisions that might be viewed as "discrimination" or "reciprocity," and for that purpose it will suffice to consider only the schemes of the United States and the European Communities.
GSP in the United States
The GSP of the United States was first enacted in the Trade Act of 1974 and took effect in 1976. It is presently authorized through 2006 and will then expire unless renewed by act of Congress.
The statute has three sections --a general grant of authority to the President to extend preferences. 7 a section on he designation of beneficiary countries,' and a section on the designation of eligible products. Pursuant to these provisions, quite a number of nations that have become highly successful exporters, such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, have now been "graduated" from the U.S. scheme due to their "high income" status. Several nations have had their GSP status suspended temporarily due to problems in their worker rights practices, including Nicaragua, Paraguay and Chile. Some of the benefits to Argentina wei suspended in 1997 over an intellectual property dispute, and some of the benefits to Pakistan were suspended at one time but later restored in return for cooperation in anti-terror efforts. Beneficiary status has also been denied to a number of nations with whom the United States has had poor political relations (e.g., Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria)." 1 It is assuredly possible that geopolitical considerations play a broader role ,sub ro.sa in many of the decisions regarding beneficiary status, and there is no mechanism to ensure that the various criteria are applied in careful and even-handed fashion.
We will not dwell at length on the provisions for the designation of eligible products. as they are unlikely to he at the heart of any dispute over "discrimination" or "reciprocity" (although they might be said to cause defacio discrimination as indicated). Because they are relevant to an assessment of the economic effects of the system, however, we note three important details.
First, many sensitive items are excluded by statute from the GSP system, such as certain textile and apparel products, watches, electronic products, steel products, footwear and leather products, certain agricultural products, and "any other articles which the President determines to be import-
Second, a product from a particular beneficiary becomes ineligible for coverage if there is no longer a "competitive need" (unless it comes from a least developed beneficiary Third, all items are subject to rules of origin. In general, a product will not be decmed to originate in a beneficiary nation unless it meets a 35 percent value added test -the value of tile input products produced in the beneficiary nation, plus the value of processing in that nation, must equal 35 percent of the value of the finished good,"
GSP in the European Communities
The European approach to GSP has evolved considerably over time. The system in place through 1994 relied hea% ily on quantitative limits for the importation of duty-free or reduced-duty industrial and agricultural products. The arrangement challenged by India, which is now authorized through the end of 2005, relies to a much greater extent on "tariff modulation" and "special incentive" arrangements, coupled with provisions for country and sectoral graduation as well as an "everything but arms" arrangement for least-developed countries."
The tariff modulation arrangement classifies goods into "very-sensitive," "sensitive,"
"semi-sensitive" and "non-sensitive" products. Roughly speaking and with a few exceptions.
beneficiary countries then receive tariff reductions of IS percent, 30 percent, 65 percent and 100 percent, respectively, off the usual MFN rate for goods in each category. Least-developed countries, however, receive duty-fIree treatment on goods in all categories except armaments.
Countries can be completely graduated from the system based on a "development index," and individual exports from particular countries can also be graduated based on a combination of' considerations relating to the development index and to the beneficiary's market share or degree of specialization in a particular product.
"Special incentive arrangements" provide additional margins of piclerencc to nations that Finally, the scheme contains a number of "temporary withdrawal and safeguard"
provisions. The most important are aimed at import surges, and allow preferences to be suspended after an investigation of such developments. Other provisions for temporary withdrawal apply to situations where the beneficiary country has been shown to have tolerated slaery, violated worker rights, exported goods of prison labor, failed to take appropriate means to control drug trafficking, engaged in fraud with respect to rules of origin, engaged in "unfair trade practices," or infringed the objectives of certain fishery conventions.
The policies favored by the European system differ somewhat from the policies encouraged by the United States, although there are notabl, similarities. Both systems certainly exhibit a significant degree of "discrimination" and "reciprocity" in their design and in their application that goes well beyond simply the more favorable treatment of least-developed nations that was envisioned by UNCTAD Resolution 23(ii).
India's Complaint and Its Legal Basis'
As noted earlier, India's original complaint before the WTO challenged the labor, enviromnental, and drug-related preferences in the European GSP scheme, but India later restricted its challenge to the drug-related preferences. Its decision to restrict the scope of its The legal foundation for India's challenge begins with GATT Article I. which requires that any "advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" granted by one member nation to the product of another and relating, inter alia, to "customs duties and charges of any kind." must also be granted "immediately and unconditionally" to like products originating in other member nations.
This pi inciple is commonly termed the "most-favored nation" (MFN) obligation of GATT.
Any GSP scheme, of course, involves tariff discrimination by the preference-granting nation. It thus requires some derogation from the legal prohibition in Article I, which was first allowed under a ten-year waiver approved by the GATT membership in 197 1. During the Tokyo Round, hoikever, GATT members negotiated an agreement to make the authority permanent, embodied in the so-called "Enabling Clause."
The relevant text of the Enabling Clause provides:
.l. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable ticatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties.
2.
The provisions of paragraph I apply to the following:
(a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized System of Preferences... (ornaIl riomte)
(z)
Special treatment of the least developed among the developing countries in the context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries.
3.
Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause:
shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countrier and not to raise barriers to nr create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties;
(b)
shall not constitute an impediment to tile reduction or elimination of tariffs and other restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation basis;
(c) shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to developing countries be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries".
(original footnote) As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 June 1971, relating to the establishment of "generalized, nonreciprocal and non discriminatory preferences bcneficial to the developing countries."
The Enabling Clause plainly allows nations to depart from the MFIN obligation to provide more favorable tariff treatment to goods from developing countries, and to provide even more favorable treatment for goods from the least-developed countries. Its text is otherwise silent on the range of goods to be covered by preferences, on the permissibility of other forms of "discrimination" among beneficiaries, and on the acceptability of attaching conditions ("reciprocity") to preferential benefits. Footnote 3, however, states that the "Generalized System of Preferences" contemplated by the Enabling Clause is the system contemplated in the 1971 waiver, which in turn referred back to the "generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory" system of preferences discussed under the auspices of UNCTAD.
Footnote 3 raises a number of issues not directly addressed by India's complaint. What is meant by the requirement of "generalized" preferences -does this obligation place any limits on the exclusion of particular products from GSP schemes? What does the obligation to provide "non-reciprocal" preferences imply about the imposition of conditions for the granting of preferences?
India's complaint put these issues to the side and focused instead on the requirement of non-discriminatory preferences. According to India, when a nation grants a preference on a particular product, it must extend that preference to all developing countries, subject only to the proviso that least-developed nations can receive greater preferences. Because the drug-related preferences in the European scheme afford special benefits to twelve enumerated beneficiaries that are not ro-extensivc with the set of least-developed nations, India contended, the preferences failed the requirement of non-discrimination under the Enabling Clause and in turn violated GATT Article I. Second, Europe argued that India misinterpreted the requirement in footnote 3 that preferences be "non-discriminatory." For Europe, "discrimination" involved arbitrary differences in the treatment of similarly situated entities -as long as differences in treatment could be justified by a legitimate objective, and the differences were reasonable in pursuit of that objective, no "discrimination" should be found. 20 Third, Europe argued that paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, which authorizes "prefcrential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products originating in developing countries," does not require preference-granting nations to afford preferences to all developing countries. Had the drafters meant to require that preferences be extended to all, Europe suggested, they could have inserted the word "all" into the text.
The European
India's response to the first and third arguments was that the term "developing countries" in paragraphs 3(c) and 2(a) should be read as all developing countries, i.e., developing countries as a group. Preferences should respond to the "development, financial and trade needs" of those countries as a group, claimed India, and should not vary in accordance with any individual needs.
Paragraph 2(a) likewise provides no authority for picking and choosing among developing countries in India's view. This proposition is reinforced by footnote 3 and its reference to nondiscriminatory preferences, according to India, which should be read to require formally identical treatment subject only to the exceptions specifically contemplated by the Enabling Clause.
The panel addressed each of Europe's arguments separately, but its analysis of all three was strikingly parallel. The panel found that the relevant portions of the text of the Enabling Clause were ambiguous. Following the Vienna Convention, it then turned to the context of the treaty text, its object and purpose, and other aids to interpretation. It noted that the Enabling Clause referred back to the waiver granted in 1971, which in turn made reference to "mutually acceptable" preferences.
The "mutually acceptable" preferences were apparently those 7o Robert ltowse advances another line of argument that Europe did not pursue in the case. He suggests that the "obligations" in footnote 3, particularly the obligation to afford "non-discriminatory" preferences, were never intended to have binding legal effect but were merely aspirational. The only other potential limitations on coverage addressed by the UNCTAD negotiations concerned measures to withdraw preferences or to set quantitative ceilings when exporters achieve a certain competitive level along with safeguard measures to address import surges.
On the basis of these findings, the pancl accepted India's suggestion that the phrase "developing countries" in paragraph 2(a) refers to all developing countries, 21 and implicitly as well its suggestion that the reference to "developing countries" in paragraph 3(c) is to developing countries as a group. According to the panel, paragraph 3(c) does not authorize differences in preferences except those contemplated by the UNCTAD negotiators. 22 Finally, the panel found no basis in the text or relevant negotiating history for Europe's suggestion that the requirement of "non-discriminatory" preirences was satisfied as long as differences in treatment resulted from objective criteria relating to legitimate objectives. Rather, footnote 3 "requires that identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all developing countries without differentiation," excepting only the differential treatment expressly contemplated in the Agreed Conclusions. whether the drug-related preferences were genuinely aimed at the protection of human health in Europe, questioning their "necessity," and questioning whether they amounted to an arbitrary discrimination among beneficiary nations where similar conditions prevail in violation of the chapeau to Article XX. 24 Europe did not appeal these findings.
The Appellate Body Decision
The Appellate Body affirmed the proposition that the Enabling Clause is an exception to GATT Article I. India had the burden of raising the question whether Europe's system was consistent with the Enabling Clause and did so; Europe then had the burden of proving its consistency.
Europe did not appeal the panels interpretation of paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause, as the panel had not made any explicit "findings" regarding the consistency of the European drug preferences with paragraph 3(c). The appeal was thus confined to the question whether the European system was consistent with paragraph 2(a) and with its footnote 3 requiring "non discriminatory" preferences. On the latter issue, the Appellate Body found that the ordinary meaning of the term "non discriminatory" did not permit it to choose between the competing views of discrimination put forth hy India and the European Communities, 5 Both parties agreed that "discrimination" entails disparate treatment of those "similarly situated," btl disagreed on what it means to be "similarly situated" -an appeal to the ordinary meaning of the term "discrimination" does not resolve such a disagreement.
The Appellate Body then turned to paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause to provide further context for the interpretation of the non-discrimination obligation, and accepted the European argument that the absence of the word "all" before "developing countries" implies that "closed list" of twelve countries. The regulation creating the preferences did not set out any criteria for the selection of the countries, and it did not provide any mechanism for adding or deleting countries as their circumstances changed. Under these conditions, Europe failed to demonstrate that its preferences were non-discriminatory.
Along the way, the Appellate Body contrasted the labor and environmental incentive arrangements in the European GSP scheme. Unlike the situation with the drug-relnted preferences, the regulation creating the labor and environmental incentives provides "detailed provisions setting out the procedure and substantive criteria that apply to a request... to become a beneficiary under either of those special incentive arrangements."
The Appellate Body thus hinted that those aspects of the European scheme might pass the non-discrimination test if challenged, but did not speak to the concurrent issue of whether the labor and environmental incentives respond to legitimate "developmcnt, financial and trade needs."
Legal Commentary

An Assessment ofthe WTO Outcome
As with most hard cases, it is difficult to say which side was "right" on a purely legal basis. The case is hard because, as both the panel and the Appellate Body acknowledged, the text of the Enabling Clause is ambiguous. Even assuming that footnote 3 vas intended to create a binding non-discrimination obligation, as did the parties to the case, the absence of any definition for the concept opens the door to a wide range of interpretations. Any student of civil rights law, constitutional law, or even GATT Articles I and Ill is well aware of the fact that "discrimination" is an extremely elastic notion. The phrase "developing countries" in paragraphs 2(a) and 3(c) is equally difficult to pin down. It is surely true, as the Appellate Body notes, that the drafters could have said "all developing countries," but did not. Yet, it is equally true that the drafters might have said "particular" or "selected" developing countries, or used some other phrasing to signify the acceptability of differential treatment, but did not. As always, inferences about the " AB Rcp. 1182.
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2-intentions of drafters from phrasings that they did Plo employ are questionable at best.
In the face of such ambiguit), the panel relied primarily on historical context and the waiver. This understanding of the economic rationale for the UNCTAD negotiations lends further support to the conclusion of the panel. If developed nations are allowed to engage in whatcver degree of discrimination they wish without legal constraint, an essential purpose of the UNCTAD negotiations is clearly jeopardized. And even if nations are only allowed to aflbrd differnntial treatment according to their assessment of the individual "development, financial and trade needs" of beneficiary countries, the danger still arises that they will use such authority to justify discriminatory policies that benefit countries in favor rather than for any legitimate purpose. For these reasons, it is entirely plausible that negotiators would want to limit discrimination to fairly narrow considerations, such as status as a least-developed nation, and to forbid it otherwise.
UNCTAD
But an important counterargument must be acknowledged. The parties to the UNCTAD negotiations were aware of the potential political impediments to the implementation of GSP, and might well have thought that compromise on various margins, in ways not fully anticipated during the negotiations, would be mutually preferable to political impasse and the Stauls quo an e.
A 1968 OECD report, for example, embraced the principle that "preferences should be granted to any country, territory or area claiming developing status (principle of self-election), but preference-giving countries might decline to grant such treatment to a particular country on compelling grounds." (emphasis addcd) 32 The scope of the term "compelling grounds" was not made clear. We cannot rule out the possibility that donor countries may have been unwilling to give much of consequence had they imagined that a tight prohibition on discrimination and reciprocity would apply going forward, and developing countries may well have been willing to take what they could get. This proposition is very much in the spirit of the argument put forward elsewhere by Robert Howse (2003) , who contends that the language of footnote 3 was never intended to create a binding legal obligation.
It is also noteworthy that major GSP schemes put in place afler UNCTAD 11 from the outset contained exemptions and restrictions that were not specifically contemplated in the " See UNCTAD (198 1, p.2 1) .
Agreed Conclusions. The long list of factors that foreclose beneficiary status under U.S. law, for example, has remained the same in large part since the Trade Act of 1974." 3 These early practices of donor countries were firmly in place at the time of the negotiations that resulted in the Enabling Clausc. 34 Had it been the intention of the Tokyo Round negotiators to outlaw the sort of conditionality that had emerged, for example, in the U.S. scheme devised by the Trade Act of 1974, they might well have done so more forcefully than by a somewhat oblique reference in footnote 3 to the system contemplated by the also somewhat oblique 1971 waiver.
From this latter perspective, the Appellate Body might be seen to have the better of the argument. It is certainly difficult to quarrel with its conclusion that Europe's interpretation of the phrase "devcloping countries" in paragraphs 2(a) and 3(c) of the Enabling Clause is a linguistically plausible one, and for the reasons noted above it is not entirely clear that the nondiscrimination obligation in footnote 3 rules out any differential treatment not expressly contemplated by the Agreed Conclusions. One might even wonder whether the Appellate Body goes too far in suggesting that donor countries must prove that any differential treatment is justified by reference to differences in "development, financial and trade needs.*' The supporters of the 1971 waiver could have anticipated that GSP schemes would contain a wide range of other conditions and restrictions to make them politically saleable in the donor countries.
In short, we concur with both the Appellate Body and the panel in their finding that the language or the Enabling Clause is ambiguous, and is insufficient on its own to resolve the dispute. It is thus appropriate to resort to other aids to interpretation in accordance with the Vienna Convention, including the "context" of the treaty language and its "object and purpose."
There can be little doubt that a central "object and purpose" ol'the UNCTAD negotiations was to reduce discrimination in trade preferences subject to some enumerated exceptions, and that both the 1971 waiver and the Enabling Clause may be said to incorporate this goal by reference. The approach of the panel surely docs the most to promote this objective. But we must also bear in mind that GSP benefits are a "gift" of sorts, and that donors may well have been unwilling to confer them if constrained by tight non-discrimination (and other) requirements. Developing nations may well have been aware that various fonus of conditionality would be the quidpro quo, and the 1979 Enabling Clause could easily have done much more to condemn it in clear language if that was the intention of its drafters. Perhaps unfortunately, therefbre, an appeal to the "object and purpose" of the Enabling Clause is also less than conclusive. The approach advocated by Howse also admits of easy judicial administration, as he would find no binding legal obligation at all in footnote 3. The approach of the Appellate Body, by contrast, steering a middle course of sorts, leaves fundamental and potentially thorny questions unanswered, as the next section will indicate.
Implications of the Appellate Body Decision [or Other Aspects ofExisting GSP Schemes
The Appellate Body ruling establishes two important principles: (1) footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause is a binding legal obligation, requiring "generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory preferences;" and (2) donor countries may nevertheless afford differential treatment to beneficiary nations if it is based on differences in their "development, financial and trade needs." These principles raise a wide array of issues to which the Appellate Body has not yet spoken.
Most obviously, what counts as a development, financial or trade need? The Appellate
Body did not rule on the question whether drug trafficking creates a "development need," finding 34 To be sure, some of the restrictions came under early criticism from commentators as a departure from the principles of non-discrimination and non-reciprocity. See, e.g., UNCTAD (198 1, p. 39).
it unnecessar' to address matter-on %hiieh the panel made no finding. Yet. it seems clear that the drug-related preferences were enacted for the benefit of Europe, to reward cooperation in its efforts to reduce traffic in drugs toward Europe, rather than to assist the beneficiaries in addressing any perceived "development need" of their own. Many of tile other criteria for beneficiary status found in modem GSP schemes, such as failure to aid in efforts to combat international terrorism, failure to enforce arbitral awards, or participation in a cartel such as OPEC, seem still farther removed from any "needs" of the beneficiary country. Perhaps incentive arrangements pertaining to labor rights and environmental protection can fit more comfortably into the rubric of "needs," but its scope remains completely open at this stage.
One also imagines that some constraint must exist on the magnitude of the differential treatment that is permissible to address heterogeneous development, financial and trade needs.
Even if drug-trafficking qualifies as a "need," for example, could a donor country deny preferences altogether to nations that do not have a serious drug-trafficking problem while extending substantial preferences to those that do? If the differential treatment must be justified by different "needs," it would seem to follow that it cannot exceed the amount required to address any need adequately. But how would one quantify that amount or otherwise place a principled limit on it?
Related. do donor countries have unfettered discretion to select the "needs" that they will address through differential treatment and to ignore others? Europe limits its environmental incentives in its GSP scheme to the protection of tropical forests. For example, but suppose a nation with no tropical forest can make the case that its exceptional air pollution problem poses a greater obstacle to its development than an), obstacles posed by the possible loss of tropical forest elsewhere? Would a failure to afford differential treatment to assist it in addressing its air pollution problem then amount to -discrimination?"
The puzzle as to %%hat constitutes impermissible discrimination is only part of the bigger picture. The word "generalized" in footnote 3 refers not only to the universe of beneficiary nations, but also to the scope of product coverage. The GSP system envisioned by the UNCTAD negotiators would provide broad coverage for manufactured and semi-manufactured items, limited only by quantitative ceilings or safeguard measures to address concerns about import surges. Can the complete exclusion of enumerated import-sensitive manufactured products, as in the U.S. statute as one example, be squared with the obligation to provide "generalized" preferences?
The obligation to afford "non-reciprocal" prefcrences also potentially imperils much of the conditionality in modem GSIP schemes. Sonic of those conditions, such as the U.S.
requirement that beneficiaries provide support for efforts to combat terrorism and respect arbitral awards in favor of U.S. nationals, require reciprocity essentially on their face. Others can surely be characterized as requiring reciprocity, such as the special incentives on labor and environmental matters in the European scheme. If footnote 3 truly prohibits "reciprocity," it seemingly poses an enormous threat to the elements of conditionality that have been present in various GSP schemes since their inception, and that may be essential to their perpetuation as political matter.3
In short, the Appellate Body decision puts in question many prominent features of the U.S., European and other GSP schemes, features that in some cases have been part of those schemes from the outset. It invites future challenges by countries that suffer trade diversion because of discrimination or reciprocity. even perhaps by developed nations. Donor countries will have the burden to prove their compliance with the Enabling Clause since it has now been ruled to be an "exception" to GATT Article 1. That burden may prove a difficult one to carry.
" We note in passing another limitation on reciprocity contained in the Enabling Clause. Paragraph 5 provides, in pertinent part, that "developing contracting parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall developing contracting parnies be required to make, concessions that are inconsistent with the latter's development, financial and trade needs." Although this obligation arises in the context of"rade negotiations," GSP conditionality might be viewed as setting up a "negotiation" ofsortg, and paragraph 5 would then limit the "concessions" demanded to matters not inconsistent with development, financial and trade needs.
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If successful challenges to GSP schemes multiply going forward, it is entirely possible that donor countries will choose to forego GSI' arrangements altogether. Nothing requires donor countries to maintain schcmes that are no longer palatable politically, and some (including the U.S. and European schemes) are structured to expire on their own unless the political will to renew thelm is present. A key question going forward. then. may he whether additional challenges wvill be brought as time goes on, or whether instead the interested nations will conclude that it is not in their mutual interest to rock the boat.
Economic Analysis
The legal commentary in Section II suggests several questions about GSP schemes and their place in the multilateral trading system. Do these schemes further the development goals for which they were designed? What effect do the schemes have on the economic Nelfare of countries that are not granted preferential treatment? And why might the contracting parties wish to regulate the extent of differential treatment and the conditions attached by donors when, after all, the GSP schemes are "gifts" from the developed countries to their less developed trading partners?
Economic Ehfficts oftTaril1"Preferences
We begin by describing the economic eflcts of tariff preferences both in the country or countries that receive the special treatment and in other trading partners of the preferencegranting country. Suppose first that preferences arc granted to a "small country" or to a group of countries that collectively are small. In the parlance of trade theory, a qmall country is one that cannot affect the world prices of the goods that it trades, because its imports and exports are insignificant relative to the size of world markets. When exporters in such a country face a given world price of p and an MFN ad valorem tariff rate of tA,!..v they must sell their output for p*(I+ b,, %) to be competitise in the foreign market. This price prevails as well in the home market of the exporting country, because producers will not sell at home for less than what they can earn on world maikcts, nor will they able to sell ]or more given that they choose to export at that price in a competitive equilibrium. Figure 1 shows the production and consumption levels in the exporting country prior to the time it is granted tariff preferences.
The preferences excuse the exporters in the small country from the generally applicable tariff. These exporters arc too small to affect the internal price in the preference-granting country, -. hich remains at p'. So, the exporters now can charge this higher amount and remain competitive in the foreign market. The figure shows that output expands as a result of the higher sales price, and that consumption in the exporting country contracts. For both reasons, exports grow.
The tariff preferences provide a "terms of trade" benefit to the exporting country.
Producers gain, both because their original sales fetch a higher price and because they expand output to the point where marginal cost equals p*. Some of the gain to producers comes at the expense of domestic consumers, who lose surplus because they face a higher domestic price."°B ut the country enjoys a net gain in welfare equal to.the trapezoidal area between the supply and the demand curves and bounded by p' and p'!ll+t.%WfN) Note that the price for exporters in countries that do not receive the preferential treatment remains at p'I/(]+ tAfF). Thus, all growth in trade due to the GSP reflects trade creation; the other (small) countries that export to the preference-granting country suffer no harm in this case.
3( Our analysis is predicated on the assumption that the prevailing tariff in the country that receives preferential treatment is greater than the MFN tariff in the country that grants the preferences. This assumption is reasonable in most cases, as average rates of protection are much higher in developing countries than in developed countries. If the assumption is violated, the preference-receiving country would export all of its industry output at price p', while domestic consumers would be served by imports from third-countries, where the prevailing price is pI/(l+N) and so the tariff-inclusive import price would be less than p . In the event, the terms of trade gain for the preference-receiving country is even larger than that described here, but it remains true that the preferences generate no negative externalities for third countries Now suppose that preferences are granted to a large country or to a group of countries that collectively is large. This situation is depicted in Figure 2 . As before, the granting of preferences will : :nd to raise the intcrnal price in the prefcrence-receiving country, as shown on tie lell-hand panel. But now the impact of the export growth on the world price cannot be ignorcd. The righthand panel shows that total world supply to the donor country has expanded, which means that the market clearing price falls from p* to p',,, (,. fThe prelbrence-receiving country still enjoys a terms-of-tradc gain. but not as great as before." Welfare rises by the (smaller) area bounded by the demand and supply curves and by the price lines p'(1+1rIF) and Pg'oS s. 
Market in PreferenceReceiving Country
Market in PreferenceGranting Country
In this case, the export growth in the preference-receiving country reflects both trade creation and trade diversion. The trade creation is reflected in the fact that the GSP reduces the internal price in the preference-granting country, so its consumption expands and its home production contracts. The reduction in its home production is (more than) made up by its imports from the preference-receiving country. But the fall in the world price produces a terms-of trade loss for other countries that export to the prelerence-granting country. These countries see their exports displaced in part by goods from the preference-receiving country. They also earn less from what they do sell, and their welfare falls. In this case, the GSP imposes a negative externality on the exporting countries that do not qualify for the preferential treatment, It is this "'The computational results preented by Brown (1987 Brown ( , 1989 show terms of trade gains from U.S. and European GSP schemes for most beneficiary countries.
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negative externality that might explain why a country like India would object to tile European GSP scheme." 4.2. Does GSP Promote "Development"
The Preamble to the 1971 Waiver, which provided the initial authority for tariff preferences that would othenvise violate GATT Article 1. states "... that a principle aim of the Contracting Parties is promotion of the trade and export earnings of developing countries for the furtherance of their economic development." To what extent can tariff preference schemes promote trade and export earnings for the furtherance of economic development? We address this question in the light of our brief analysis of the economic effects of tariff preference schemes, As our analysis has shown, the granting of tariff preferences does serve to promote trade volume and export earnings in the preference-receiving countries. The magnitude of this effect for existing GISP schemes is a matter of some debate, but a consensus view might be that the revenue gains have been modest but not trivial 2 9 Surely the gains could be larger but for the many product exclusions that the preference-granting countries have introduced to minimize pain to their own import-competing industries. But whatever their precise magnitude, the terms-oftrade gains provide a form of "development aid" inasmuch as they boost incomes for owners of export concerns and quite possibly for factors of production such as unskilled labor that are used intensively in export sectors in the developing countries. In this sense, the GSP schemes can be seen as serving their putative purpose.
Arguably. however. the contracting panics had more in mind. UNCTAD Resolution 21(ii) also made reference to a desire to promote industrialization and economic growth. To the 3' We also duly note the fact that the drug-related preferences in the European scheme extended to Pakistan and not to India, a situation that India may have round objectionable for political reasons.
" Sapir and L.undbcrg (1984) . Karsentv and Laird (1986) . and MacPhee and Oguledo (1991) all find modest gains in export volume and export earnings for beneficiaries of GSP schemes. They find, however, that these gains are highly concentrated in a few. higher-income developing countries. Brown (1987 Brown ( , 1989 draws similar conclusions from a computable general equilibrium model. cxtent that tariff prefercnces raise producer prices in the developing countries, they do encourage greater output of the eligible goods than would take place in their absence. However, production or those goods entails an opportunity cost, and it is hardly clear that GSP arrangements encourage the expansion of the industries that will do the most to promote economic growth over the long haul, That might prove to be the case if. for example, the export activities encouraged by GSP schemes are "infant industries" subject to positive learning externalities. Given the many product exclusions and limitations in existing GSP schemes, however, it would be a fortunate coincidence if the products that are eligible happened also to be the ones that generate learning spillovers.
Likewise, given the way that donor nations exclude import-scnsitive items from tariff preferences and otherwise "graduate" successful industries and countries, one wonders whether the industries that offer the best opportunities for "growth" to developing countries are not precisely the ones in which prefbrenccs will never he offered, or where they will be withdrawn once signs of industrial success appear. Certainly, there have been no empirical studies to suggest that GSP schemes have promoted "growth" beyond simply conferring some rents on selected industries as described above.
Moreover, the benefits of tariff preferences are diminished in practice by compliance costs. 0 The available evidence suggests that many goods imported from developing countries that appear to be eligible for preferences do not receive them. UNCTAD (1981) concluded, for example, that the "utilization rate" for various GSP schemes -the ratio of imports actually receiving preferential treatment to the total imports that are eligible under each scheme -was under 50% for the U.S. and European programs and barely over 50% for Japan. One reason given for the low ratios, though not the only reason, was the "difficulties which arise in complying with the rules of origin and other requirements of the schemes."
' UNCTAD (1999)
notes a further decline in utilization rates for some of the schemes, owing partly to an "erosion of preferences which in some cases are too low to compensate for the cost of compliance." Even in the cases in which preferences are obtained, compliance costs reduce their value.
The benefits from tariff preferences will be further diminished (or even become negative)
if they lead to overinvestmcnt in the sectors that are eligible for preferential treatment. After all, the very nature of a preference is to encourage the expansion of output to a level that would not be economical in the absence of the preference. The possibility that preferences may then distort investment decisions, rather than encouraging investment where long-terni growth opportunities are present, has been noted elsewhere 4 2 One reason to be concerned about such overinvestment is that preferences have often proven to be temporary, as product coverage and rules about conditionality and graduation have changed over time. See UNCTAD (1999). If the private sector invests on the expectation that the preferences will be long-lasting, then there may be severe resource misallocation once the preferences are removed. Of course. such a misallocation of resources should not be a problem-al least for the country that is granted preferential treatment-unless the investors misjudge the likely duration of the GSP schemes, the likelihood of changes in their rules and product coverage, or the likelihood that the MFN tariff will fall (in sohrt, an absence pf"rational expectations"). But misjudgment is a real threat given all of the moving parts and the fact that GSP programs are modified quite regularly. so because GSP preferences can reduce the incentive that export industries in developing countries have to lobby for trade liberalization at home as a means to gamer market access abroad. Import liberalization by developing countries will also shifl resources from importcompeting to exporting sectors in the those countries and may hasten the withdrawal of tile preferences as their export sectors bump up against "competitive need" and graduation provisions under GSP schemes. Export interests in developing countries may harbor mixed feelings about trade liberalization at home for this reason as well. Ozden and Reinhardt examine empirically the effect that GSP removal (as through "graduation") has had on former beneficiaries' trade policies and find that countries that lose their eligibility for GSP subsequently undertake greater liberalization than those that retain their eligibility. Some studies suggest, furthermore, that developing countries with more liberal trade policies achieve higher rates of growth and development than countries that are more protectionist. countries have done so to an even greater extent. Finally. GSP schemes may have encouraged overinvestment in sectors that will prove only temporarily eligible and may have retarded the process of trade liberalization in the eligible countries. For all these reasons, tile benefits generated by tariff preference schemes, while perhaps positive, are likely to be reasonably small.
Differential Treatment and Conditionality in Tariff Preference Schemes
Whatever economic analysis has to say about the likely benefits of trade preferences in general. the members of the WTO evidently believe that tariff prefcrence schemes do generate benefits for the favored countries and that these benefits are sufficient to justify a departure from the MFN principle. The question raised by India's challenge to the European drug-related preferences is not whether the gains generated by GSP justify the distortions that it creates, but rather what sort of discrimination within GSP schlenmes ought to be tolerated.
One might wonder why the members of the WTO would choose to regulate GSP at all.
After all, such schemes represent unilateral *'concessions" made by the developed countries to further the -'development, financial, and trade" needs of' a group of developing countries.
Shouldn't a donor have the right to set tIhe terms of his gifl and specify the beneficiaries? Don't the developing countries have the choice whether to meet tile conditions or not?
To address these questions, it is necessary to make some assumptions about the objectives of the WO Agreement. Like Staiger (1999. 2002) and Grossman and Mavroidis (2003) . we believe that the purpose of trade agreements is to limit the negative international externalities that countries create when they set their trade and industrial policies.
An externality can arise .hen a welfare-maximizing government sets a positive tariff to improve its national terms of trade. But one need not accept that governments maximize national economic welfare as conmentionally defined to conclude that agreements are meant to solve problems of international externalities. Sovereign governments can and do routinely undertake policy actions that do not promote aggregate national %vell'are. But their trading partners have no reason to interfere in these policy choices unless they suffer some harn as a result. Similarly, when two (or more) countries strike a bilateral (or plurilateral) agreement, non-parties to the agreement have no interest in it as long as the agreement does not adversely affect their interests.
But policy choices, including decisions about trade policy, often do have external consequences.
Without some sort of multilateral agreement encompassing all of the affected parties, countries will set their policies and conclude agreements without regard for the harm done to others, leading to an equilibrium from which a Pareto improvement is possible with the aid of multilateral rules. The law of the WTO can be understood as a mechanism to ensure that international externalities are taken into account.
If the objective of international agreements is to limit negative externalities, we can see why the WTO members might wish to regulate GSP. As we have discussed, when a country affords preferential treatment to a group of countries that collectively are large in the market for some good. the effect is to lower the world price of that good and to generate a tenns-of-trade loss for other countries that export the same or a similar good. A GSP scheme that targets certain countries for special treatment can bring harm to others that are not so favored. And a scheme that offers preferential treatment only when specified conditions are met can reduce welfare for those that choose not to fulfill the conditions.
The arguments for limiting differential treatment in GSP schemes parallel those that have made by economists and legal scholars to justify the MFN nle in GATT Article 1. Schwartz and Sykes (1997) argue that the MFN rule addresses a potential problem of concession erosion.
Suppose country B receives a concession from country A in the course of a trade negotiation, and that country B is not entitled to MFN treatment from country A. Then. the value of the concession could be undermined by a subsequent agreement between country A and country C that provides the latter with even better terms than were granted to country B. Anticipating this possibility, country B would offer less for the concession from country A and less trade 3+ liberalization %Nould result. Thus, the MFN rule helps preserve the incentives for trade liberalization throuch international negotiation. Staiger (2002, 2004) point to the related concept of bilateral apporunism.
Suppose countries A and B import a common good from country C and export another good to that country. Suppose further that the three countries have reached an initial agreement that is jointly efficient, in the sense that no change in tariffs can increase the welfare of one government
Nsithout reducing the welfare of another." Then, in the absence of MFN, the governments of country A and C can always find another deal that benefits themselves at the expense of country B. As Bagwell and Staiger show, these countries can reduce the tariffs they apply to one another's goods in such a wa) that the their multilateral (or weighted average) terms of trade do not deteriorate; the terms of trade loss each suffers from lowering a tariff is at least offset by the terms of trade gain each enjoys from improved access to the other's market. But the reduction of country's C's tariff on imports from A induces trade diversion front competing country B and so harms that country. And the reduction of country A's tariff on imports from C expands world demand for C's export good, which spells a further loss for country B. Evidently, in the absence of MFN. countries A and C may be tempted to strike a deal that benefits each of them at tile expense of the excluded country C.
Bagwell and Staiger go on to show that an MFN rule makes it more difficult for a pair of countries to engage in bilateral opportunism. With nondiscrimination, country C must offer the same concessions to countr) B as it offers to country A. Thus, it cannot offer to "pay for" a tariff reduction by country A with a policy change of its own that benefits country A by diverting imports to it that would othen ise come from country B. Indeed, when the MFN rule together is 41 Welfare here may be national economic welfare, if the governments are benevolent welfare maximizers, or more generally political welfare that includes otlher objectives besides just conventional economic welfare.
combined with strict adherence to the principle of "reciprocity", the scope for bilateral opportunism behavior is eliminated entirely.
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Similar problems of concession erosion and bilateral opportunism can arise in a trade regime that admits differential treatment in GSP. Suppose developed country A makes a concession to developing country B in the course of a trade negotiation. If country A subsequently offers reduced tariffs to developing country C, but not to country B. this can erode the value of the earlier concession to country B. As a consequence, country B may value the original concession less highly and so will have less incentive to open its own markets. As for bilateral opportunism, suppose that developed country A considers developing country B to be its friend and ally. By providing preferential access to its markets, country A generates economic gains for its ally %%hile furthering its own political ends. Now if country A can do so selectively (by excluding "sensitive products") and discriminatorily (by making developing country C ineligible) then country A can ensure that there are few political costs at home, and that most of the gains to country B come at the expense of other countries, especially countries whose exports are similar to those of country 13, such as developing country C. Bagwell and Staigcr (2002) have argued that the provisions of international trade agreements are intended to diminish or eliminate the scope for negative international externalities, and that agreements ought to be designed with this goal in mind. This perspcctive, with which we concur, points to a strict interpretation of footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause as a binding obligation for developed countries to treat all developing countries similarly in GSP schemes, except for the permissible special treatment of the least developed countries. However, we recognize that such an interpretation might well have a chilling effect on the willingness of 45 Bagwell and Staiger define reciprocity in GATT as the principle that changes in trade policy should leave world prices unchanged, or else those who effect the changes in world prices must compensate those who are harmed by it. The MFN rule ensures that each country faces a common terms oftrade (relative price of imports compared to exports) and not a different terms of trade with each partner. Thus, strict adherence to principles of MFN and reciprocity would imply that any bilateral deal between countries A and C does not change the relative prices faced by country, as so does not cause any hann to that country.
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developed countries to offer GSP benefits, which after all arc unilateral concessions and not negotiated as part of any trade agreement. The political realist must ask whether eliminating the scope for negative externalities is worth the cost of fewer "donated" GSP schemes. Once this trade-off is recognized. it becomes difficult to say how much differential treatment should be tolerated and under what circumstances. Economic analysis can highlight the trade-off, but only empirical and political analysis can determine the magnitude of likely negative externalities on the one hand. and the likely political response to stricter regulation of GSP on the other.
One other issue warrants brief mention. The externalities associated with trade policy are not the only externalities from global interaction. Pollution that damages the global commons or that simply crosses borders affords another class of examples, as do the costs and benefits that arise because of interdependent utilities across nations. (Indeed, GSP itself might be swen to result ftom an altruistic concern for the less fortunate.) One might argue that the negative externalities associated vsith discriminatory GSP schemes should be tolerated if discrimination nevertheless aids in addressing these other sorts of externalityv problcms. But there is an obvious difficulty with this line of argument. If preferential treatment is used to address alleged negative externalities, who among the WTO member states should decide what constitutes a negative externality and how large is its magnitude? We see no principled way to discipline a process in which each nation decides for itself what "externalities" to address through discrimination or reciprocity. And absent any discipline, the danger of a return to the pre-UNCTAD days of widespread discrimination is apparent. if discrimination and reciprocit) are to be pennitted.
therefore, we question whether they can be justified convincingly by a need to address other "externality" problems. Instead, the jutlification likely lies in the need to make GSP politically saleable in tire donor countries, bringing us full circle to the set of tradeoffs identified above.
